For that reason, the self is defined here as a totality including physical, biological, psychological, social, and cultural characteristics ( Quinn, 2006).
#Cultural notion definition for free
Since the existence of a non-material body capable of holding the self has not been demonstrated, any argument for the existence of free will must, at this point of time, be based on a monist view of human development – the capacity for free will would have had to evolve in a being whose origins are material. Free will, from this dichotomization, is ultimately independent of material conditions because it is of supernatural origin. Explicit dualism, wherein a stable conscious self is considered evidence of a non-corporeal entity inhabiting a material body, was the basis of the Cartesian notion that the physical world could be studied scientifically but the mind, which was not of this world, could not ( Descartes, 1643/1990).
Although this cognitive self may be understood as a theory of who we are ( Harre, 1989), it is not clear who or what constructs, holds or revises this theory leading to implicit dualism ( Bhaskar and Norris, 1999 Seigel, 2005 Miresco and Kirmayer, 2006). The self that is core to such psychological concepts as self-esteem, self-actualization, and self-efficacy may be understood as a culturally mediated representational construct ( Mead, 1934 Greenfield, 1995 Mischel and Morf, 2003). We conclude the body of this work with psycho-historical understanding of the evolution of the self-supporting a compatibilist account of free will. This is followed by an examination of psychologists’ inherent epistemic volitional pre-suppositions. We begin by situating the self within the context of culture. The purpose of this paper is to construct a paradigm by which a volitional individual could have evolved from determined beginnings. It seems counterintuitive that a being constituted by cultural and genetic factors could transcend those very factors. (2003) suggested people could choose to identify with a collectivity and accept its norms, but their finding that a sample of university students drawn from four cultures (Turkey, Russia, Korea, and United States) scored higher on scales of well-being if they believed they voluntarily were part of a collective is also consistent with an interpretation that free will is a self-enhancing illusion ( Taylor, 1989 Blackmore, 1999 Libet, 1999). While characterizations of “westerners” as individualist are not usually controversial, characterizations of non-westerners as groupist, collectivist, holist, or lacking in individual volition are increasingly seen as pejorative ( Strauss, 2009). The concept of individual volition is necessarily grounded in notions of free will, that we are capable of choosing our behavior. The self in modern western cultures is pictured as self-contained, independent, volitional, and materialistic while the self in collectivist cultures is described as contextual, interdependent, community orientated, and spiritual ( Cushman, 1995 Robertson, 2014). The description of modern Euro-American cultures as “individualist” creates a dichotomy with more traditional cultures then viewed as collectivist. The modern practice of psychology has been described as ethnocentric exporting Euro-American values such as individuality and self-volition to indigenous cultures worldwide ( Adair, 2006 Christopher and Hickinbottom, 2008). Implications for therapeutic practice and future research are discussed.
The paper proposes a model of a culturally evolved self that is compatible with understandings of free will and determinism. Drawing on research into classical cultures, this paper builds an argument that the notion of free will was adaptive flowing from culturally evolved changes to the self, and that this “evolved self,” containing assumptions of personal volition, continuity, and reason, became benchmarks of what it means to be human.
While compatibilists have suggested that notions of free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive, the psychological mechanisms by which such an accommodation could be explained have been inadequately explored. It is suggested in this paper that the rejection of classical behaviorism by psychology and other humanities flowed from deeply held cultural assumptions about volition and free will. Most schools in psychology have emphasized individual choice despite evidence of genetic and cultural determinism. Integrated Studies, Athabasca University, La Ronge, SK, Canada.